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Manfred Kerber1 and Michael Kohlhase2
Abstract. The semantics of everyday language and the semantics
of its naive translation into classical first-order language consider-
ably differ. An important discrepancy that is addressed in this paper
is about the implicit assumption what exists. For instance, in the
case of universal quantification natural language uses restrictions and
presupposes that these restrictions are non-empty, while in classi-
cal logic it is only assumed that the whole universe is non-empty.
On the other hand, all constants mentioned in classical logic are
presupposed to exist, while it makes no problems to speak about hy-
pothetical objects in everyday language. These problems have been
discussed in philosophical logic and some adequate many-valued
logics were developed to model these phenomena much better than
classical first-order logic can do. An adequate calculus, however, has
not yet been given. Recent years have seen a thorough investigation
of the framework of many-valued truth-functional logics. Unfortu-
nately, restricted quantifications are not truth-functional, hence they
do not fit the framework directly. We solve this problem by applying
recent methods from sorted logics.
1 Introduction
From the first attempts of modelling everyday reasoning within the
framework of classical logic, it has been known that many relevant
aspects cannot be adequately expressed in classical first-order logic.
The attempts to cope with these have lead to a variety of logics.
In this paper we address one of these problems, namely that of
so-called presuppositions, where natural language allows to draw
conclusions that classical logic does not warrant (for instance im-
plicit consensus that universally quantified statements range over
non-empty domains). These phenomena have been widely studied in
the philosophy of language from a semantic point of view, but lack
an efficient mechanisation, which is a primary concern of artificial
intelligence. One of the more logic-oriented ways to cope with this
phenomenon is to use a four-valued logic [3]. We take this logic as a
starting point of a mechanisation by a resolution calculus.
There are two different kinds of presuppositions: the quantifica-
tional ones presuppose that the domain of quantifications is non-
empty and the existential ones assume the existence of constants. In
natural language, the first ones are mandatory, whereas the second
kind is defeasible (it is possible to talk about non-existing entities
in natural language). Surprisingly enough, the standard semantics of
classical logic treats the two kinds almost the opposite way: con-
stants always must have denotations, that is, just speaking about an
object means that is must exist (for instance, speaking about a dragon,
means that there is one), while quantifications are unrestricted and
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therefore always range over the whole (non-empty) universe. In clas-
sical logic the standard way to restrict a quantification is the use of
an implication, which may, however, have an antecedent with empty
domain.
A first attempt to overcome this problem is to employ three-valued
Kleene logic, where a third truth value  	
 is assumed which
is given to every atomic formula containing a non-determined object
like a dragon. This approach has been disputed since it does not allow
hypothetical reasoning of the kind “Let us assume that all dragons
can fly and that Tabaluga is a dragon, hence Tabaluga can fly.” If we
assume that Tabaluga does not exist, in a representation of Kleene
logic the last statement        would be evaluated to
 	 and not to true at all.
In [3] Bergmann proposes a four-valued logic to cope with pre-
suppositions. She essentially argues that the semantical status of
a formula has two independent dimensions, first a classical truth
value, i.e.,  or  , and second a value, which tells whether the for-
mula is secure (i.e. talks about existing objects) or not. In the case

 

 
 , the formula should be true but insecure.
While the presupposition that all mentioned objects exist is ade-
quate unless the opposite is explicitly said, the quantificational pre-
suppositions of everyday languages differ from those in classical
logic. For instance, an everyday sentence like “All children of John are
sleeping” presuppose that John really has children. Therefore the rep-
resentation in classical first-order logic ﬀﬁ ﬂ  ﬃ ﬁ "! ﬃ ﬂ  $#
%&'%'
ﬁ is not adequate, since this sentence is true even when
John has no children at all.
To overcome this problem Bergmann proposes a restricted quan-
tification of the syntactic form ﬀﬁ
ﬂ
 ﬃ)(+*,
!
ﬃ
ﬂ
'-
%&'%'
ﬁ ,
where the semantics of the quantifier is defined such that for a true
and secure universally quantified statement the restriction expression
is assumed to be non-empty.
Our mechanisationis basedon the work of Carnielli [2], Ha¨hnle [5],
Baaz and Fermu¨ller [1], who have developed methods for the opera-
tionalisation of many-valued first-order logics. However all of these
approaches have in common that they are truth-functional, that is,
composed formulae obtain their truth values from their components
and (for quantifiers) from all instances of the scope. Therefore a di-
rect utilisation of these methods is impossible for Bergmann’s logic,
since the quantifiers range only over a restricted domain.
2 Logic
The main feature of Bergmann’s logic for presuppositions [3] is a two-
dimensional set of truth values, where the classical two are replaced
by four truth-values which are represented by pairs, where the first
component consists of the values true and false, and the second of
the values secure and insecure. In the following we denote these truth
values by . ,  . , '/ , and  / .
c
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In this paper, we further formalise Bergmann’s logic and in par-
ticular present a resolution calculus for this logic. Starting from an
approach like that in [6] where we have presented a mechanisation of
three-valued Kleene logic, the main problem of this work is to give
a proper treatment of restricted quantification and their presupposi-
tions. The range of the quantifiers is restricted and assumed to be
non-empty.
In the following we present the logic system 132 , which is a variant
of Bergmann’s ideas from [3]. The treatment of the restriction part
of a quantification is very similar to the sort techniques developed
in [8].
Definition 2.1 (Signature) A signature Σ: 4 5 768719 consists of
the following disjoint sets: 5 is a countably infinite set of variable
symbols, 6 is a set of function symbols, and 1 is a set of predicate
symbols that contains a special predicate : , called security predicate.
The sets 6 and 1 are subdivided into the sets 6<; of function symbols
of arity = and 1 ; of predicate symbols of arity = . Note that individual
constants are just nullary functions.
Definition 2.2 (Terms and Formulae) We define the set of terms to
be the set of variables together with compound terms > @? 1 BABABAB ? ;
for terms ? 1 BABABAC ? ; and >EDF6 ; . The set of formulae consists of
atoms ( G @? 1 BABACA ? ;  , where GHDI1 ) and of compound formulae
JLKNM
,
JLONM
,
J
#
M
, P
J
, !
J
, T
J
, ﬀQﬁSR
J
, and TﬁSR
J
, where
J
,
M
, and U are formulae.
The intended meaning of the restricted quantification ﬀQﬁ R J is
that
J
holds for the set of all ﬁ for which U holds, and that furthermore
this set is nonempty. The meaning of !
J
is that
J
is secure, and that
of T
J
is that
J
holds, but may be insecure.
Note that the concept of restricted quantification is a generalisation
of sorted logics, where variables are restricted by so-called sorts, i.e.
unary predicates: For any unary predicate GIDV1 the restricted quan-
tification ﬀQﬁSW *
J
is equivalent to the sorted quantification ﬀQﬁSW
J
as it can be found in sorted logics.
For an intuitive treatment of presuppositionsfor terms (correspond-
ing to questions whether Pegasus exists, whether it is a horse, or about
the nature and existence of it’s left front hoof) we use a set of so-called
term declarations.
Definition 2.3 (Term Declarations) Let J be a formula, then we
call
JYX (the formula J indexed with the intended truth value Z[D
\
t .  f .  t /  f /3] ), a labelled formula. The set ^3: of term decla-
rations is a set of labelled formulae.
We now will define the four-valued, two-dimensional semantics
for 132 by decorating the truth value of a formula with a “security
value”. Thus the set of truth values contains 
.
and 
.
for secure
truth and falsity and )/_  / for the insecure ones.
Definition 2.4 (Σ-Algebra) Let Σ be a signature, then a pair ` bac
is called a Σ-algebra with carrier set ` , iff the interpretation function
a maps 6 and 1 to functions and predicates of the appropriate arity
over ` . The only restriction we pose is that a  :dfe
\
t .g f .
]
.
We call elements h8D ` secure, if a  :i  h'j4 t . , else insecure,
and we subdivide ` into subsets ` . of secure and ` / of insecure
elements. Our definition of semantics entails that ` 4 ` .lk ` / and
`
.Vm
`
/n4Fo .
Note that our treatment of undefined elements differs from the
Kleene approach taken in [6], where all undefined elements are iden-
tified, since here we want to be able to reason about properties of
undefined objects instead of only stating undefinedness.
Definition 2.5 (Σ-assignment) Let ` bac be a Σ-algebra, then we
call a total mapping p : 5rq # ` a Σ-assignment. We denote the
Σ-assignment that coincides with p away from ﬁ and maps ﬁ to h
with pj
s h'tﬁ)u .
Definition 2.6 Let p be a Σ-assignment into a Σ-algebra ` baj then
we define the value function awv from formulae to ` inductively to be
1. a v  > : 4xa  > , if > is a function or a predicate.
2. a v  ﬁ : 4Ep  ﬁ , if ﬁ is a variable.
3. a v  > @? 1 BABAAC ? ; 7 : 4xa  >  awv @? 1 yCABABABzawv @? ; 7 , if > is a
function or predicate.
Note that this definition applies to 1 and 6 alike, thus we have given
the semantics of all atomic formulae.
Definition 2.7 The value of a formula dominated by a connective is
obtained from the value(s) of the subformula(e) in a truth-functional
way. Therefore it suffices to define the truth tables for the connectives:
K
t . f . t / f /
t . t . f . t / f /
f . f . f . f / f /
t / t / f / t / f /
f / f / f / f / f /
O
t . f . t / f /
t . t . t . t / t /
f . t . f . t / f /
t / t / t / t / t /
f / t / f / t / f /
P
t . f .
f . t .
t / f /
f / f /
# t . f . t / f /
t . t . f . t / f /
f . t . t . t / t /
t / t / f / t / f /
f / t / t / t / t /
T
t . t .
f . f .
t / t .
f / f .
!
t . t .
f . t .
t / f .
f / f .
For formula U and each variable ﬁ (we call the pair  ﬁ {U| a restric-
tion) let
`d}
v

U~7ﬁS4
\
hD
`

a
v
,  {*B
UxD
\
t .  t /
]]
`
.
v

U~7ﬁS4
\
hD
`


a
v
,  {*B
Un4 t .
]
We call a restriction  ﬁ "U_ empty, if ` }
v

U37ﬁ is. With this we can de-
fine the semantics of the universal quantifier by requiring a v  ﬀﬁ R
J

to be
 t . , if a
v
,  
"*B
J
4 t . for all hD ` }
v

U~7ﬁS and ` .
v

U3ﬁSŁ4o
 f . , if there is an hD ` }
v

U~7ﬁS with a
v
,  
"*B
J
4 f .
 t / , if a
v
,  
{*B
J
4
\
t .  t /|] for all hD ` }
v

U~7ﬁS ,
but a
v
,  
"*B
J
4 t / for some hD ` }
v

U~7ﬁS .
 f / , if there is an hD ` }
v

U37ﬁ with a
v
,  
"*B
J
4 f /
Note that with this definition, the condition that p  ﬁSD ` }
v

U3ﬁS
is conserved. We call this condition well-sortedness of assignments.
Consequently, all assignments in the construction of the semantics
of a sentence are well-sorted, if we start from the empty assignment
(which we can always do, since like in classical logic the value of a
formula only depends on those for it’s free variables). Thus we will
restrict ourselves to well-sorted assignments.
With the specification of the behaviours of the connectives and
quantifiers we have completed the definition of the semantics of
formulae. We say that a labelled formula
JX
is satisfied by p , iff
a
v

J
_4Z and valid, iff it is satisfied by all well-sorted assignments.
Remark 2.8 Now we can further study the relation of restricted
quantification to sorted logics. Those usually define the carrier ` Wx
` for any sort (unary predicate GIDN1 ) as ` W : 4 \ h8D ` 

a

Gl

h'
4 t
]
and use that to define sorted quantification as awv  ﬀﬁSW
J
 to
be true, iff a
v
,  
"*B

J
 is true for all hD `
W
. Note that sorted logics
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usually assume that the ` R are non-empty3 and therefore lead to the
same presuppositions as 132 on the sorted fragment.
We exploit this similarity in this paper by generalising sort tech-
niques for the mechanisation of 132 .
Definition 2.9 (Σ-Model) Let J be a formula, then we call a Σ-
algebra  : 4 ` baj a Σ-model for J (written 4 J ), iff a v  J 34
t . for all Σ-assignments p . With this notion we can define the no-
tions of validity, (un)-satisfiability, and entailment in the usual way.
For a set ^3: of term declarations, we say that  is a ^3: -Model, iff
all labelled formulae in ^3: are valid (cf. 2.7).
In the following we will only consider ^3: -models. From a purely
theoretical point of view, term declarations do not yield more ex-
pressivity, since they can be axiomatised (any intended truth value
can be characterised by combinations of the connectives ! and  ).
However, from a practical point of view, the term declarations pro-
vide a convenient means of specifying the belief about existence and
sortality in the world. Furthermore, the term declarations can be used
for optimisations of the calculus by sorted unification as in [7].
Remark 2.10 The “tertium non datur” principle of classical logic is
no longer valid, since formulae can be insecure, in which case they
are neither true nor false. We do however have a “quintum non datur”
principle, that is, formulae are either true or false, but independently
they can be secure or not, which allows us to derive the validity (i.e.
that it is true and secure in all models) of a formula by refuting that
it is false or insecure or both. We will use this observation in our
resolution calculus below.
3 Resolution Calculus ( < )
In this section we present a resolution calculus f132 that is a gen-
eralisation of the resolution calculus for partial functions [6], which
in turn is a joint generalisation of Weidenbach’s logics with dynamic
sorts [8] with ideas from [1, 5]. There are two variants of the sorted
calculus, we have generalised both for our purposes, but in this paper
we only present the first (simpler) version due to the lack of space.
Definition 3.1 We will call a labelled atom 
X
a literal and a set of
literals
\

X
1
1 BABABAC{
X

]
a clause. We say that a Σ-model  satisfies a
clause  , iff it satisfies one of its literals 
X
D , that is, a v  
X
j4
Z .  satisfies a set of clauses iff it satisfies each clause. In order
to conserve space, we employ the “,” as the operator for the disjoint
union of sets, so that $7
X
means  k
\

X
]
and 
X
is not a member
of  . Furthermore we adopt Ha¨hnle’s notion of multi-labels in the
form 
J
X
to mean 
J
X

J

.
Now we are in the position to give a set of transformations that
take a set of labelled formulae to a refutationally equivalent set of
clauses.
Definition 3.2 (Transformations to Clause Normal Form)


JKVM

t  

J t  

M t  
$

J¡K8M

f  
$
J f  

M f  
3 The logics of Cohn and Weidenbach [4, 8] do away with this restriction that
has always been considered as a technical anomaly that has alleviated the
need of special treatments in the transformation to clause normal form and
for instantiations in the resolution calculus: A unifier that contains variables
of sorts that are empty does not lead to a correct refutation.


J¡KM

t ¢

J t ¢

M t  

J t ¢

M t ¢

J t  

M t ¢


P
J

t  

J f  


P
J

f  
$
J t  


P
J

t ¢



P
J

f ¢

J t ¢
,
f ¢


ﬀﬁSR
J
s ﬁSR	u£
t  

J
s ﬁ R u
t  
s >
¤
1
BACABAB
¤

7tﬁ)u£U
t  


ﬀﬁSR
J
s ﬁSR	u£
f  

J
s >
¤
1
CABABA
¤

¥u
f  


s >
¤
1
ABACAB
¤

7t
ﬁ)u£U|
t   t
¢


ﬀﬁR
J
s ﬁSRu@
f ¢

J
s >
¤
1
BABABAB
¤

¥u
f
¢


s >
¤
1
BABABAC
¤

7t
ﬁ)u£U_
t   t
¢

 !
J

t  

J t   f  
$
 !
J

f  

J t
¢
f
¢

 !
J

t ¢

$
 !
J

f ¢


 T
J

t  

J t   t
¢

 T
J

f  

J f   f
¢

 T
J

t
¢


 T
J

f
¢

where
\
ﬁSR¦
¤ 1
BACABAB
¤

]
4 Free 
J
 and > is a new function symbol
of arity § . Here Free 
J
 denotes the set of free variables of
J
.
The transformations can be directly derived from the semantics of
the connectives and quantifiers. Due to space restrictions we have not
presented all of them above. Note that the transformations for the uni-
versal quantifier have to associate the restriction U with the variable
ﬁ , that is, in the resolution setting, we assume variables to be pairs,
consisting of a symbol and a restriction. Furthermore Skolem func-
tions have to conserve security and insecurity. In particular Skolem
constants are always secure.
Note that this set of transformations is confluent, therefore any
total reduction of a set Φ of labelled sentences results in a unique set
of clauses. We will denote this set with CNF  Φ  .
Assumption 3.3 The clause normal form transformations as pre-
sented above are not complete, that is, they do not transform every
given labelled formula into clause form, since the rules for quantified
formulae insist that the bound variable occurs in the scope. In fact the
handling of degenerate quantifications poses some problems in the
presence of possibly empty restrictions, as quantification over empty
sets are vacuously true. In this situation we have three possibilities, ei-
ther to forbid degenerate quantifications, or empty restrictions, or treat
degenerate quantifications in the clause normal form transformations.
For this paper we chose the first, since degenerate quantifications do
not make much sense and do not appear in everyday language. See [7]
for the other possibilities. Thus we will assume that in all formulae in
this paper the bound variables of quantifications occur in the scopes.
As usual the reduction to clause normal form conserves satisfiability.
Theorem 3.4 Let Φ be a set of labelled sentences, then the clause
normal form CNF  Φ  is satisfiable, iff Φ is.
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Proof sketch: The assertion critically depends on the fact that the
notion of satisfiability employed there takes the restrictions into ac-
count: A clause is valid in a Σ-model  , iff for one literal 
X
a v

j4¨Z for all well-sorted assignments p into  . With this
notion, the assertion can be reduced to the standard argumentation
about Skolemisation and a tedious calculation with the truth tables
from 2.7.
Now we proceed to give a simple resolution calculus, which utilises
standard (unsorted) unification. In [7], we have further improved a
similar calculus by using a sorted unification algorithm, which dele-
gates parts of the search into the unification algorithm. For unsorted
substitutions a naive resolution rule is unsound. Therefore we have to
add a residual (the restriction constraint) that ensures the soundness
(with respect to the restrictions on the variables) of the unifier.
Definition 3.5 (Restriction Constraints)
Let ©N4Is ? 1 tﬁ 1
R 1 ubABACABs
?

tﬁ

R

u be a substitution, then we define the
restriction constraint for © to be the clause
|ª

©~ : 4
\

s
?
1
tﬁ
1
u@U 1 
f   f ¢
BACABAB

s
?

tﬁ

u£U


f   f ¢
]
These labelled formulae are residuated in the f132 rules and have
to be refuted in order to guarantee that ` }
v

U3
?
 holds (cf. defi-
nition 2.7) for every instance ? instantiated for a variable ﬁ with
restriction U .
Definition 3.6 (Resolution Inference Rules ( f132 ))

X
{ «

"¬
Res
©

y©

¬y7_ª

© 

X
"«
X
y
Fac
©


X
y7©

y|ª

©~
where ZFŁ4­ and © is the most general unifier of  and « . Here we
have assumed Z and ­ to be single truth values, naturally the rules
can be easily extended to sets of truth values.
Remark 3.7 Note that clauses containing
J t   f   t
¢
f
¢ are tautolog-
ical and can therefore be deleted in the generation of the clause
normal form as well as in the deduction process. The calculus can be
extended by the usual subsumption rule, allowing to delete clauses
that are subsumed (super-sets).
Definition 3.8 Let
J
be a sentence and Φ be the clause normal form
of the set
\\
J f  
,
t ¢
,
f ¢
]]
then we say that
J
can be proven in f132
( ® J ), iff there is a derivation of the empty clause ¯ from Φ with the
inference rules above.
Theorem 3.9 (Soundness) f132 is sound.
Proof sketch: The soundness of the resolution and factoring rules is
established in the usual way taking into account that the restriction
constraints make the substitutions “well-sorted” and thus compati-
ble with the semantics: The restriction constraints add two literals

s
?
tﬁ'u@U|

 


s
?
tﬁ)u£U|

¢ per component of the substitution, which
only can be refuted if indeed  s ? t
ﬁ)u£U_    or  s ? tﬁ'u@U| )¢ are valid.
Definition 3.10 Let  : 4
\

X
1
1 ABABAC"
X

]
be a clause, then the con-
ditional instantiation ©¦°   of © to  is defined by
©¦°

 : 4
\
©


X
1
1 yBACABAB7©


X



]
k
_ª

©

 Free (²±¦- 
The following result from [8] is independent of the number of truth
values.
Lemma 3.11 Conditional instantiation is sound: for any clause  ,
substitution © and Σ-model  we have that ³4´©w°   , whenever
³4 .
Definition 3.12 Let
J
be a sentence and CNF 
J
 be the clause nor-
mal form of
J
, then we define the Herbrand set of clauses CNF µ  J 
for J as \ ©¦°   

¶D CNF 
J
y·© ground  Dom  ©~34 Free   ]
Definition 3.13 We will call two literals 
X
and 

complementary,
if ZŁ4¸­ .
Definition 3.14 (Herbrand Model) Let Φ be a set of clauses, then
the Herbrand base ¹  Φ  of Φ is defined to be the set of all ground
atoms containing only function symbols that appear in the clauses
of Φ. If there is no individual constant in Φ, we add a new constant
º
. A valuation » is a function ¹  Φ  q #
\
t .  f .  t /  f /
]
. Note
that these literals are not complementary since » is a function. The
Σ-Herbrand model ¹ for Φ and » is the set ¹ : 4 \  X 

Z¼4
»

cy7LDN¹
 Φ  ] .
We say that a Σ-Herbrand model ¹ satisfies a clause set Φ iff for all
ground substitutions © and clauses ID Φ we have ©w°  m$¹¨Ł4o .
A clause set is called Σ-Herbrand-unsatisfiable iff there is no Σ-
Herbrand-model for Φ.
Theorem 3.15 (Herbrand Theorem) Let J be a formula, then the
clause normal form CNF  J  has a Σ-model iff CNF µ  J  has a
Σ-Herbrand-model.
Proof: Let ½4 ` baj be a Σ-model for Φ : 4 CNF 
J
 . The set
¹ : 4
\

X


¾D8¹
 Φ y"Zn4¡a
v

j
]
is a Σ-Herbrand model for Ψ : 4 CNF µ 
J
 if p is an arbitrary Σ-
assignment, since obviously awv is a valuation. To show that indeed
¹ is a Σ-Herbrand model for Ψ, we assume the opposite, that is,
there is a clause ¿D Ψ, such that ¹ÀmH4Áo . Since ¿D Ψ
there is a substitution ©¡4´s ?Â tﬁ Â
RÃ
u and a clause ¬¨D Φ, such that
4Ä©¦°

¬_4©

¬
k
|ª

©  .
Without loss of generality we can assume that a  U
Â


awv
@?
Â
79D
\
.c7)/
] , since otherwise a v  s ?7Â tﬁ
Â
u£U
Â
fD
\

.c

/
] , and therefore

s
?Â
t
ﬁ
Â
u£U
Â
·ÅÆDN¹ for ÇD
\

.c

/
] , which contradicts the assump-
tion. Thus the mapping È : 4Fpj
s awv @?7Â 7tﬁ Â u is a Σ-assignment.
Note that since  is a model of Φ, we have that   4É¬
and therefore there is a literal 
X
DF¬ , such that Z¶4ÊawË  ji4
a
v

©

c7 , hence ©  jgD8¹ , which contradicts the assumption.
For the converse direction let ¹ be a Σ-Herbrand model for Ψ and
` the Herbrand base for ¹ . Furthermore let a  >

 and a  G

 be
partial functions, such that
a

>


@?
1
BABABA
?

 : 4E>

@?
1
ABABAB
?

 iff >

@?
1
BABACAB
?

cD
`
a

G


@?
1
BABAAB
?

 : 4Z iff  G

@?
1
BACABA
?

7
X
DN¹
We proceed by convincing ourselves that Ì4 Φ. Let ÍD Φ and
p : 4Is ? Â t
ﬁ Â
R
Ã
u be an arbitrary well-sorted Σ-assignment. Since ` is
a set of ground terms p is also a ground substitution and moreover

s
?
Â
t
ﬁ
Â
u£U
Â


 
DN¹ or  s ? Â t
ﬁ
Â
u@U
Â

)¢
DN¹ by construction of a and
the fact that p is well-sorted.
¹ is a Σ-Herbrand model for Ψ and thus p °  )mi¹Í4  p   k
|ª

p37'md¹ÎŁ4Fo . Because ¹ cannot contain complementary literals
we must already have a literal p  
X
ÏD´p

fmx¹ . Now let »
be the valuation associated with ¹ . Since p  
X
nDÐ¹ we have
Zx4I»

p

j7g4¸a
v

j , which implies Ñ4 v 
X
. We have taken
 and p arbitrary, so we get the assertion.
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Corollary 3.16 A set Φ of ground unit clauses is unsatisfiable iff it
contains two complementary literals.
Theorem 3.17 (Ground Completeness) Let Φ be an unsatisfiable
set of ground clauses, then there exists a f132 derivation of the
empty clause from Φ.
Theorem 3.18 (Completeness) f132 is complete.
Proof sketch: For the proof of this assertion we combine the com-
pleteness result from the ground case with a lifting argument. It turns
out that the lifting property can be established by methods from [8],
since they are independent of the number of truth values.
4 Example
At first we want to give an example for quantificational presupposi-
tions and then shortly discuss existential presuppositions.
Let us assume the following information. There is a company
TheCompany which wants to fire people, but they have a social
touch and don’t fire any persons which have children. We are worried
whether John will be fired, but then we hear that his children are
sleeping. Implicitly we can conclude from this information that John
has children and hence will not be fired.
This can be encoded in 132 by the following statements:4
A ﬀﬁ)Ò 	
Ó%' ﬂ ÔﬃBÕ	&   ﬁS3#ÖP &  Ó   ﬁS
B ﬀﬁ
Ò

T
¤
Ò
ﬂ
¤
7ﬁS73#
&

Ó


ﬁS
C ﬀﬁ

ﬂ
'(×*,
!
ﬃ
ﬂ
'-
%&'%)
ﬁS
T P 	Ó%' ﬂ ÔﬃCÕ	&   y! ﬃ ﬂ  
with the term declarations  :  ﬂ ÔﬃCÕ	&   7    and  :  ! ﬃ ﬂ  7    .
In order to prove the theorem T, the following generalised clause set
has to be refuted:
A  ﬀﬁ Ò 	
Ó%' ﬂ ÔﬃBÕ	&   7ﬁS|#ÖP &  Ó   ﬁS7   
B  ﬀﬁ)Ò  T ¤ Ò ﬂ ¤ 7ﬁS73# &  Ó   ﬁS7  
C  ﬀﬁ

ﬂ
'(×*,
!
ﬃ
ﬂ
	-
%&'%)
ﬁS7

 
T  P 	Ó%' ﬂ ÔﬃCÕ	&   y! ﬃ ﬂ  7  ¢
, 
 
, 
¢
By the rules for forming a clause normal form we get the clauses:
A1 	Ó%' ﬂ ÔﬃBÕ&   7ﬁ Ò 7

 

@&

Ó


ﬁ
Ò
7

 
A2 :  º 1   
B1  
ﬂ ¤ Ò 7ﬁ Ò 7

 

@&

Ó


ﬁS7

 
B2 :  º 2    
B3 :  º 3    
C1 ¥%&	%' ﬁ

ﬂ
Q(×*,
!
ﬃ
ﬂ
	-
7

 
C2  
ﬂ  º 4 y! ﬃ ﬂ  7   
C3 :  º 4    
T 	Ó%' ﬂ ÔﬃBÕ&   y! ﬃ ﬂ  7

¢

	Ó%'
ﬂ
ÔﬃBÕ&


y!
ﬃ
ﬂ

7

 

	Ó%'
ﬂ
ÔﬃBÕ&


y!
ﬃ
ﬂ

7

¢
By resolution we get from Res(B1,C2):
R1 @&  Ó   ! ﬃ ﬂ  7      :  º 4 7

 


:

º
4 7

¢
Two-times resolving with C3 results in:
R2 @&  Ó   ! ﬃ ﬂ  7   
which in turn can be resolved with A1:
4 There is a typo in the treatment of formula B in
the proceedings, which is corrected here.
R3 	Ó%' ﬂ ÔﬃBÕ	&   {! ﬃ ﬂ  7

 


:

!
ﬃ
ﬂ

7

 


:

!
ﬃ
ﬂ

7

¢
The last two literals can be resolved away using the term decla-
ration  :  ! ﬃ ﬂ  7    . T can be resolved three times with the result-
ing unit 	Ó%' ﬂ ÔﬃBÕ&   y! ﬃ ﬂ  7

 
, whereby finally the empty
clause is derived.
Please note that in a direct first-order translation of the above text,
the essential information in C2 that John has a child cannot be derived
and hence no proof can be found.
The second form of presuppositions concern the fact that all con-
stants of classical logic exist just because of mentioning them. For
instance, classical logic is not a good tool for a dispute of a theist
and an atheist about the existence of God, since if the atheist only
mentions God, he would admit the existence of God. In 132 , however,
the status of statements about constants can be insecure and in par-
ticular no existence is assumed, unless otherwise specified by term
declarations.
5 Conclusion
We have developed a four-valued logic for the formalisation of ev-
eryday reasoning with presuppositions. This system generalises the
system proposed by Bergmann in [3]. Furthermore we have presented
a sound and complete resolution calculus for our system, which uses
the sort mechanism to capture Bergmann’s restricted quantifications.
Our calculus can be seen as an extension of classical logic that
combines methods from many-valued logics (cf. [1, 5]) for a correct
treatment of the secure and insecure information and order-sorted
logics (see [8]) for an adequate treatment of restricted domains. In
contrast to the partial function calculi in [6, 7] 132 does not identify
the insecure objects. However, just like in these logics, most defined-
ness preconditions can be taken care of in the unification, making
inferencing quite efficient.
Even though the research on presuppositions in linguistics has
nowadays turned to dynamic and more pragmatically driven analyses,
and away from the multi-valued treatment, this is not a counter-
argument to our system. In contrast to classical logic 132 makes it
possible to specify (and reason with) presuppositions, so that once
the linguistic analyses are used for reasoning, some system like our’s
will be indispensable.
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